Reichenbach is now often lumped together with the logical positivists of the Vienna Circle, but his ideas, especially those in Experience and Prediction, were often developed in opposition to positivism. Reichenbach frequently sought to save concepts and problems from the many positivists who sought to discredit them. For example, he thought that causality has a place in science and that the problem of the external world is not a pseudo-problem. Indeed, Reichenbach always defended realism against positivism, and his defense was truly ingenious. It has been standard for decades to refer complacently to "the demise of logical positivism," but the so-called positivists were more various than the standard stereotype would suggest. In addition, Reichenbach's independent outlook connects in substantive ways with research agendas that now thrive in post-positivist philosophy of science. We hope that the essays collected here will be a resource for philosophers who work on the problems that Reichenbach addressed, and also that these essays will be useful to historians who want to develop a deeper understanding of Reichenbach in his historical context. We are grateful to Joshua Filler, Omca Korugan, Zeynep Savas, Tugba Sevinc, and Erturk Demirel for their help in organizing the Istanbul conference and in helping prepare these papers for publication.
